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V'hen the writer began this paper there was not in existence an
easily available account of ohe powers that have been exercised by
American Presidents in the time of war. Americans remember occasion-
ally some striking statement concerning the authority exercised by
President Lincoln, such as that made by Lord Bryce and quoted, with
endorsement, by James Ford Rhodes, that "Abraham Lincoln wielded more
authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell.'"
And there is current today a very well-founded conviction that powers
of the greatest and most far-reaching character have been entrusted
to ^oodrow '.Vilson and his administration. But very few know or
could easily find out just what these war-powers of American Presi-
dents are and what form they have taken in the past and are taking to-
day. This paper is an attempt to furnish such an account.
It is often claimed by historians, that a study of the past
furnishes the perspective which is necessary to a proper interpreta-
tion of '.he present. This is an application, and it is hoped, a
vindication of this claim.
This particular subject of comparison is interesting just now
for a special reason. It is one of the tenets of political and his-
torical orthodoxy that in executive administration, democracy is less
efficient than monarchy or empire. And probably evidence could be
found in the past to pretty well substantiate this principle. If it
is true that democracy is bound by its inherent nature to a certain
degree of inefficiency, then that is a cause for deep regret to a na-
* Bryce, American Commonwealth, vol. 1, page 61.
** Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. IV, page 165.

tion which is so committed to democracy as this one. It is worth
while, perhaps, to remember that bec-.use inefficiency has characteriz-
ed democracies in the past, it does not follow from that evidence al-
one tnat it always and inevitably will do so in the future. The
bases for which democrats can hope, on which to rest a faith in the
possibility of a thoroughly efficient democratic state, are first, the
fact that theirs is a comparatively new form of government; that while
empires and monarchies have for many centuries been learning to meet
the exigencies that confront states, and can draw upon the lessons of
a long past, modern democracy (which is as different from those early
experiments in Greece as a man is different from a protogopn)is a
creation of the last hundred years. And secondly, he has a sure
ground for hope, if during its brief existence, there has been great
and continuous increase in the executive efficiency of democratic
governments. The present study throws some light on the latter ques-
tion. The executive efficiency, or inefficiency, manifested by dem-
ocracy in the trial of war will go far toward bringing out its latent
possibilities of this sort.
There are two bases on which the war powers of an American Pres-
ident should properly be classified. These are first, the source
from which the power is derived, and according to this the following
groupings are possible: 1) lowers granted by act of Congress under the
Constitution, 2) Powers granted by the Constitution, 3) F.xtra-legal
and extra constitutional powers, 4) Illegal and unconstitutional
powers. The other basis for classification is the nature of the
powers themselves, and here five groups can be made. 1) military,
2) Industrial and Commercial, 3) Financial, 4) Political, 5) Police.
Of course, military powers mean only those pertaining directly to the
control of the armed land and naval forces. ..any other than strictly

Military powers are exercised on ^he jround o 4* military expediency-
even the Emancipation Proclamation was announced as a military meas
With this much introduction, this paper will describe, first
the war powers of "-resident Lincoln, then the war powers exercised
by "resident Tilson, up to date, indicating where each falls in the
two classifications of war powers suggested. It will then proceed
to comparisons and conclusion.
* the first paragraph of the Proclamation speaks of the measure
which it orders as a "fit and necessary war-measure for suppress
ing rebellion." Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, volume VI, pa^e 157.

CHJLPTEE TWO
WAR POWERS OF PRESIDENT LI1ICOLN
Let us consider first the war powers of President Lincoln as
granted directly by the Constitution. The Constitution of the
United States makes the following provisions as to the power of the
executive in the conduct of war and regulation of military establish-
ments :
Article 1 section 1. "The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the United States of America."
Article 1 section 2. "The President shall be the commander-in-
chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia
of the several States, when called into the actual service of the
United States... and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardor
for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeach-
ment .
"
Article 1 section 3. "lie fthe President) shall from time to
time give to the Congress information on the State of the Union, and
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge nec-
cessary and expedient."
The first requires an act of Congress as a rule to make it
effective, and the last amounts to very little unless the formal mes-
sages to Congress can be backed by effective personal dealing with
Senators and Congressmen, and therefore "-it will be taken up under the
Presidents extra-legs 1 and extra-constitutional powers.
The functions of the President as commander-in-chief of the
army and navy are somewhat peculiar. It id highly probable that the
purpose of the framers in making this arrangement was less to con-
stitute the President the field-marshal who should direct the course






make the American army the President's army, as the English army
was the Zing's army, with the purpose of assuring themselves through
such a personal union of civil and military pov/er, that no general
would ever arise like the duces of declining Rome, to seize control
of the State with armed forces. The business of fighting is a high-
ly technical affair, distinctly a field for those who combine expert
training and first class natural ability of this peculiar kind. That
^residents elected from civil life on political issues should always
be fit for actual military command is hardly what veteran warriors
and keen-sighted statesmen like "'ashington and Franklin, for instance
would have counted on.
As a matter of fact the actual military functions of our war-
Presidents have been chiefly limited to the appointment and removal
of generals who direct the fighting. Lincoln's long experimentation
with different army-masters is too well known to need comment. He
was far too wise to interfere often with field operations. In the
case of his violent disagreement with Srant about the way to attack
Yicksbirg he soon yielded, and afterwsrd acknowledged that he had
been mistaken. Only four o" his executive orders make any mention of
the disposal of armies. One, dated January 27. 1862, ordered that
"the 22 day of February 18G2, be the day for a general movement of
the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent-
forces,"* mentioned specifically the army about Fortress Pionroe, the
Army of Potomac, the Army of 77e stern Virginia, the array near Llunford-
ville, "lentucky, tne army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force
in the Sulf ot Pexico. The next is dated January 31, 18G2, direct-
ing the army of the Potomac to seize Manassas Junction.**
*?.ichardson, Messages and Papers, volume VI, page 100-101.
**Richardson, Messages and Papers, Volume VI, page 101
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?he third was issued on ^arch 8 t 1362, and it reorganizes the army
into fire new dirisions, specifying their .commanders.* The fourth
"bears the some date, P.arch 8, 1062. It orders that "ITo change of the
base of operations of the army of the Potomac shall be made without
learing in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion of the
General in Chief .. .shall leare said city entirely secure." There
follow other specific directions for driring the Southern forces froir
the neighborhood of Washington.** In certain matters of broad mili-
tary policy it is proper that the President should interfere. A
typical case of this kind is the establishment of the blockade of
Southern ports. And in certain cases in which the beharior of armies
and naries has a significant political bearing, the xJresideiit ' s in-
terference may be of the utmost ralue. Lincoln's administration pre-
sents striking examples of such cases. On August 30, 1861, General
Fremont issued an order freeing all slares who reached his lines.***
This alarmed the border States which were ready to fight for the
Union but scarcely for emancipation. After prirately asking Fremont
to change the form of his order without success, the President order-
ed him to change it "to conform to the terms of the Confiscation
Act."**** And he voided a similar order by General Hunter on May 19,
1862.***** On the whole the country approved both actions but to
those who opposed them, they brought home the immense power that the
President exercises in times of war when the beharior of great armies
and great populations is at his disposal as military and ciril head
of the State. Sumner wrote, "Our President is now dictator, impera-
tor--what you will; but how rain to hare
*Richardson, Messages and Papers, rolume vl, page 110.
**Pichardson, -essages and Papers, rolume VI, page 110
** TRhodes, HJ story of the United States, rolume 111, page 478.
****Rhodes, History of the United States, rolume 111, page 470.
*****Rhodes, History of the United states, rolume 111, page 470
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the power of a god and not to use it godlike."*
besides the war powers directly granted by the Constitution,
Lincoln exercised oertain powers in the Civil TTar which the Con-
stitution denies the executive, and still others which it forbids to
any branch of the government. On May 3, 1861 he issued a pro-
clamation increasing the regular army 22,714 men and authorizing the
enlistment of 18,000 seamen for naval service. How the Constitu-
tion vests the power to "raise and equip armies" in the Congress,
not in the executive. Rhodes T remarks that "Such action, though
clearly beyond the President's constitutional authority, received
the approval of the I.'orth and later of Congress."**
If to increase the regular army and authorize enlistment of
additional seamen is "clearly beyond the President's constitutional
authority,"*** it is difficult to see what constitutional defense
can be made for the famous call for 70,000 volunteers. In fact,
the Southern governors strenuously protested that such action was un-
constitutional.*'** But the evidence is unmistakable that the
Ilorth approved , for the volunteers came forward with a rush. And for
immediate purposes the approval of the Horth was more important than
the forms of the Constitution.
But the famous and flagrant infringements of the Constitution
were the arbitrary arrests.***** Some samples are the f oil owing:
the arrest of two men at Maione in northern Hew York; and editor of
the Hew York Daily Hews at Burlington, New Jersey; two citizens of
riaine; a Vermont farmer, who was lied to in order to get him to go to
Bennington, two miles away; a crippled newsboy for selling the Hew
*Pierce's, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner, vol. lV,page42
**?.hodes, History o^ the United States, vol.111, page 395
Hicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, vol. Vll, page 2.
***"Since only Congress can raise and equip armies."
****2reeley, American Conflict, page 459.
****Lincoln, himself oame very close to admitting the unconstitu-
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ionality of these arrests. ^or instance in a letter of April 4,
1669, quoted by T Ticolay and Hay; Complete 7orks, volume 11, page
508 and volume VI page 430, "V.'as it possible to lose the nation and
yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must
be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;
but a life is never wisely givon to save a limb. I felt that mea-
sures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming
indispensible to the preservation of the Union and therefore the
preservation of the Constitution.Right or wrong, I assumed this
ground." He ^irst states this same doctrine in the executive order
if February 14, 1862. "In this emergency the President felt it his
luty to employ with energy the extraordinary powers which the Con-
stitution confides to him in case of insurrection. He called into
the field such military and naval forces, unauthorized by the ex-
isting laws, as seemed necessary. Hi directed measures to prevent
the use of the post-office far treasonable correspondence. He
subjected passengers to and from foreign countries to new passports
regulations, and he instituted a blockade, suspended the writ of
habeas corpus in various places, and caused persons who were re-
presented to him as being or about to engage in disloyal and treas-
onable practices to be arrested by special civil as well as military
agencies and detained in military custody." 3ut the Constitution
does not anywhere confer on the President special powers of any
kind in case of insurrection and certainly not these powers.
(Bichardson, Messages and Papers, 7olume VI, page 103.)

York Daily "ews on the ITaugatuck railroad in Connecticutt; several
citizens of Connecticutt for organizing "peace meetings;" Dr. Edson
B.Olds in Ohio, a man of 70, who was dragged from his house at night
without legal warrant and incarcerr ted summarily in a fortress for
alleged treasonable utterances; James W.Wall, a :iew Jersey lawyer
and author, for severe criticism of the administration,* The most
famous case of all was the arrest of the Democratic candidate for
governor in Ohio by o rder of General Sternsids, and his sentence by
military court marshal to imprisonment for the length of the war.
This man, Yallandigham, was the Western leader of the Democratic
party, and so much excitement was occasioned that Lincoln commuted
his sentence to banishment and he fled for his liberty to the Con-
federacy, and thence to Canada.** September 24, 1862 tne President
issued a proclamation, giving the authority of executive order to
Secretary Stanton's orders,*** which created the new offenses of
"discouraging enlistments" and "any disloyal practice," and provid-
ing that whoever was guilty of these offenses and of anything else
affording "aid and comfort to the rebels should be "subject to mar-
tial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or
nilitrry co:!imissions , " and for persons arrested on these charges
suspended the writ of '. ebeas corpus .**** Thereupon Joel Parker,
;hen Professor and afterward the greatest Dean of Harvard Law School
asked the people of i.Iassachussetts , "Do you not perceive that the
President is not only a monarch but that his is an absolute,
*V.arshall' s American Bastile; Debate in the Senate Dec. 16, 1862.
**Khodes, History of the United States, vol. IV, pages 247-248.
Burnside's order for the violation of v/hich Yallandigham was
arrested, numbered 38, was, "The habit of declaring sympathy for
enemy will not be allowed." Rhodes » comment is that "?rom tne
be^innin-T to the end of these proceedings, law and justice were
n«T ax naught."
***Hhodes t vol. "T , r, 1C3.
* **Linooln; "Complete "Torks", vol. 11, page 239.
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irresponsible , uncontrollable government; a perfect military despot-
ism?"* And tjie matured judgment of the period's best historian is
that "This proclamation. . . was the assumption of authority exercised
by an absolute monarch."** In a lecture delivered in ITew York and
s
Boston Dec. 1361, lendell Phillips said: "Lieber.says that habeas
corpus t free meeting like this, and a free press, are the three ele-
ments which distinguish liberty from despotism But today, Mr.
Chairman, every one of them.... is annihilated in every square mile o:
the Republic. Ife live today, every one of us, under martial law.
The Secretary of State puts into his bastile, with a warrant as irre-
sponsible as that of Louis, any man whom he pleases. And you know
that neither press nor lips may venture to arraign the government wit!
out being silenced. At this moment, 1000 men at least are 'bastiled 1
•••three times as many as Tlldon and Jeorge 111 seized when they trem-
bled for his throne... For the first time in our history government
spies frequent our great cities."***
Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Russell September 6, "The United States
government assumes the right to arrest persons in any part of the
country, and to keep them during its pleasure in confinement in charge
of military officers. The courts of law. are unable to give any re-
dress as the officers of the army decline to make any return to writs
of habeas corpus .**** As to the number of persons thus mistreated,
Alexander Johnson states in his article on Habeas Corpus inLalor f s
Cyclopedia, that "The records of the provost-marshall' s office in
Washington show 38,000 military (meaning political) prisoners report-
ed there during the rebellion." Col. F.C .Ainsworth, Chief, Record
and Pension Office, Tar Department***** declares that "a thorough
*3oston Courier, Hov. 1, 1062.
**Rhodes, History of the United 8ti tes, volume IV, page 169.
***Rhodes, History of the United States, volume IV, page 169.
****3ritish Blue Book, September 6.
*****Rh;;des. History of the United States. volurnelV, pages 221-232.
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search of the records (referred to) have been made. ..but nothing what-
ever relative to the subject has been found. I am satisfied that
this statement .. .we s really nothing but a guess." However, in the same
place Col. Ainsworth says that the records of the Commisssry-Seneral
of prisoners show 13,535 citizens confined in various military prisons
during the war. And he adds, "It is certain that a considerable
number of arrests of civilians in addition, • .were made during the war
because it is known that prisoners of this class were confined in
State prisons and Penitentiaries, the records of wnich are not on file
And he adds that probably this list would not include persons arrested
by Secretaries of State and -avy.*
It is a very interesting study in human nature, and a somewhat
important side-light on the characteristics of democratic government,
to observe how these measures were taken by the people. If democracy
3an with ease be slid over into despotism- an event which has occurred
nore than once in the course of history, it behooves us to be on our
juard. On the other hand, if the people recognize these infringement:
lpon their liberties for what they are, and slough them off with the
return of peace, at the same time endeavoring to provide somehow for
;he emergency of war in a way that will obviate these impositions upon
'reedom, then we may be reassured. As has been indicated, there 7/ere
jreat men, and there were many of them, who fought these arbitrary
)0wers bitterly and openly, whose high position and obvious disinteresl
idness made their arrest impossible. Senator Trumbull of Illinois
introduced a resolution asking for information from the Secretary of
State in regard to these arrests, " .'hat are we coming to*" ne sai(i »
"if arrests can be made at the whim or caprice of a cabinet minister,"
* Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. IV, pages 231- 238.
** Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. Ill, page 556.

And the Democratic party did what it could in opposition, but it was
very hard, with the censorship that existed, to circulate the opinionc
of the opposition. The things that might have happened if the papers
had pushed such news and the people had been allowed to see the thing
clearly for long at a time, is interestingly suggested by the way
Democratic majorities suddenly increased in districts just after a
particularly flagrant case of this kind had occurred. Vallandigham
was defeated, for some northern victories immediately succeeded his
arrest, though before they occurred the administration had been ex-
ceedingly nervous about what might happen. "Rut two cases are those
of Dr.'Pdson B.Olds, who was elected while in prison to represent his
neighbors in the legislature; and of James W 9Wall, whose arrest in-
creased the normal Democratic majority in Hew Jersey, and who was
elected by the State legislature to fill an unexpired term in the
Senate.* And the Congressional elections of 1862 came near to being
what so loyal a Republican journal as the ITew York Times declared
them to be: a "vote of want of confidence in the President".** never-
theless, there can be no doubt that the country as a whole acquiesced
in these abuses of executive power. Rhodes' explanation is : "That
the protests against the arbitrary arrests lacked energy and persis-
tence, that the infringements upon the bill of rights of the Constitu-
tion were not actively resisted, is explicable only by tne confidence
the people had in Abraham Lincoln."*** This is satisfactory as an
*Rhodes, History of the United States, volume IV, page 165.
**Lincoln , s interpretation of this vote is indicated by Rhodes, vol,
111, page 105. "It must be reckoned as one of the results of
the election, that he (Lincoln) issued, November 22, an order
which effectuated the discharge from military custody of
praotioally all the political prisoners."
***Rhodes, History of the United States, volume 111, page 165.
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explanation, but not reassurir r. For it is by no means impossible
tnat a man who deserves confidence less than Abraham Lincoln did,
should sain and hold the confidence of the people for four years.
Count Surowski wrote in his diary, January 1862, "The thus called ar-
bitrary acts of the government prove how easily, on the plea of pat-
riotic necessity, a people, nay, the public opinion, submits to arbit-
rary rule. All this, servility included, explains the facility with
which, in former times, concentrated and concrete despotisms have been
established. Here every such arbitrary action is submitted to be-
cause it is so new, and because the people has the childish naive, but
to it honorable, confidence that tne power intrusted by tne people
is used in the interest and fo'r the welfare of the people. But the
despots of all times and of all nations said the same. However, in
justice to Mr, Lincoln, he is pure and has no despotic longings, but
he has around him some atomistic Torqemadas."*
It is important to enquire whether all this iron-handed supp-
ression served any useful purpose. There is always a great temptation
to it on the part of administrators in time of war. In the light of
history, does it do them eny good? It has already been said that it
aroused such opposition that Lincoln for the time discontinued it,
which suggests that in his judgment it was not at that time doing his
administration any good. Although the prisoners were released tne
policy of making new prisoners in practically the same way was con-
tinued, the only difference being that military authorities alone
could make the arrests: "Sxtra ordinary arrests will hereafter be made
tinder the direction of military authorities alone."** But even aside
from Lincoln's apparent attitude at the time, does it now seem to have
*Khodes, History of the United States, vol. Ill, page 556.
**Richardson, i.les^ages and fapers, volume VI, pege 157.
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cemented the North to the policy of the administration? Lincoln's
act in freeing political prisoners in the midst of the continuance
of arrests, gives us a- chance to compare the country "before these
individuals were at large, and after. Jo far as it is possible to
see today after the most careful scrutiny, the fact that these
people were at liberty hindered the government none at all. Certain-
ly far less than when they were shut up and all their friends were
protesting.
The conclusion from my study of unconstitutional action may
be put about as follows: in the midst of a desperate war, our demo-
cracy, in striving after the efficiency and despatch which charact-
erizes irresponsible power, ceased for the time being to be democ-
racy, and became in the language of Joel Parker and James Ford
Rhodes 1
,
an absolute monarchy; and that such a course is as danger-
ous as it is unnecessary.
The Emancipation Proclamation would be entirely illegal from
the strict construction point of view # The Constitution, of course
gives the President no specific grant of authority for such an act
of wholesale manumission, and there was no act of Congress under
which it
^Samples of the orders for arbitrary arrests are given in Rhodes',
History of the United States, vol. IV, page 235. "Telegram, m7ar
Department, V.'ashingt on, October 19, 1861. Richard H.Dana Jr. U.
S. District Attorney: Send Williaih Pierce to ^ort Lafayette.
fmJf 9 Seward. " Cobgress authorized executive suspension of habeas
corpushy an act of : larch 3, 1863. (Burgess, The Civil "Tar and the
Constitution, vol. 11, page 224.) Burgess says (page 217 of The
Civil ^ar and the Constitution,) "It may therefore be claimed that
it i3 the precedont of the Constitution in civil war that the




might be done. However, it is an act which on a very liberal inter-
pretation of the constitution, can be defended. As already indicat-
ed, Lincoln rested it on the war-powers granted to the President by
the Constitution. Its military efficacy is very doubtful. It is
impossible to prove that it hastened the end of the war a single day.
But its other political effects of course, were very great. Thence-
forth and irrevocably, slavery was as much the issue as the Union.
To declare that the nation would use its armies and navies to end
chattel slavery throughout the resisting South, was to exercise large
powers. They were the larger, since thers was on the records of Con-
gress at that time a resolution introduced by Congressman Crittendon,
passed four days after the Battle of Bull Ran, which at that time had
riven "expression to the common sentiment of the country touching the
object of the wnr," and which declared that the war was "not waged,
to... interfere with.
.
.established institutions of the Southern States
but to .. .preserve the Union."* At the time when the Emancipation
Proclamation was issued, however, Northern sentiment supported it, so
far as words W*nt "t least. But recruiting, although it showed a
slight gain over the previous low rate, did not more than barely re-
spond to the success of Antietam.
Probably the next most famous exercise of war power by Presi-
dent Lincoln was the first American conscription. So fc.r as his own
action in this regard is concerned, his right was unimpeachable,
amounting to a duty, for he had an act of Congress to go upon. The
ri?ht of Congress to pass such a law under its constitutional authori-
by to raise and equip armies, can hardly be doubted, and the Supreme
Sourt has up held it. With certain
* Rhodes, History of the United States, vol. Ill, page 464.
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exceptions especially s-^t "^orth, the Aot declared that all able-
bodied male citizens and persons of foreign birth who had declared
their intention to become citizens, between the ages of 20 and 45,
should constitute the National forces, and empowered the President to
call them ~orth to drrft.* The enrollment for draft was on ] larch 3,
1363. nhero v/erc some small disturbances but they were quickly put
down.** The drawing occurred in the middle of July. And in New
York there broke out one o p the wildest riots that ever occurred in
this country. negroes were hung in the streets and extensive areas
were burned. A report to Washington says: "In brief, the city of
New York is tonight at the mercy of the mob."*** One principal
reason for popular discontentwas aprovision which allowed the. hiring
of substitutes or the payment of 300 dollars for the hiring of sub-
stitutes. This highly untactful plan looked to the poor like a
plan for making the draft selective of themselves, end added to their
natural impatience of compulsion. The riot lasted four days, and
then subsided, leaving conscription to go steadily on.**** Thus was
placed at the President's absolute disposal the material for as power-
ful an army as the world has ever seen. ITo wonder Bryce thought of
Cromwell!
The Lincoln Administration w- s given great and extraordinary
powers in finance. The #900,000,000 loan, passed in January 1863,
authorized more bonds, more interest-bearing treasury notes, more non-
interest-beerin? treasury notes, and fractional paper currency, Or
-
* ::icolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, vol. Yll, page 56.
This ri.rht of Congress has been upheld by the Supreme Court in
the cases testing the recent draft act. Arver vs. United
States (U.S. Supreme Court, January 7, 1913) 38 Sup. Ct. 159.
** Appleton's Annual Cyclouedia, 1363, page 317.
*** Rhodes, vol. XTV11, page 886.
**** Rhodes, vol. IV, pages 321-528.
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dinarily, of course, Cor, Tress must make appropriations for expendi-
tures. But this act allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
before the next Congress, :!|>900, 000,000 of the securities authorized,
at his own discretion. This sum would not be overwhelming in modern
war-finance, but it left the government of those times fairly well
assured that they would be able to supply the sinews of war for a
while .*
Aside from this act, the chief financial power exercised by the
Administration was in suggesting policies to Congress. Since Cong-
j
ress very closely followed the policy laid down for it, this amounted
to a good deal. This was not directly President Lincoln's power, fox
he knew little about finance and left such matters to his Secretary ot
the Treasury Chase, who was supposed to know a great deal but who
made serious mistakes,**
The President, of course, is given the power to communicate
~ith Congress "on the state of tne Union'J by the Constitution. But
whether that power is great or small depends on the willingness of
Congress to follow his suggestions. And under certain circumstances,
Rarely in Lincoln's day). , tne President through unofficial channels
can make his will felt in Congress. Lincoln had a majority o" his
own party to work with. But it was a divided majority, a part of
irhich was offended at first by his refusal to issue any statement com-
nitting the ITorth to a war on slavery, and the other part of which was
Dffended after the Emancipation Proclamation was made. And it was
51 majority tnat very deeply distrusted a large part of the cabinet-—
srith more or less reason. After the defeat of Fredricksburg tne
Senate passed a resolution calling for the resignation of Secretary
*Rhodes, -istory of the United States, volume IV, page 238.
^Rhodes, history of the United States, volume IV, page 427.
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Seward. Rhodes says that Congress would have voted lack of confidence
in the President himself.* Lincoln hung on and brought his cabinet
tnrough intact, but the distrust was by no means either allayed nor
silenced. Of all Lincoln* s cabinet, probably Chase commanded the
most Congressional respect. But in spite of these difficulties, the
party nun.? together, and voted Lincoln the broadest powers, for it
recognized the peril of the emergency and the demand for vigorous ex-
ecutive action. The attitude is typically expressed by Senator
Sherman in a letter to his brother the general: "I cannot respect
some of tne constituted authorities yet I will cordially support and
aid them while tney are authorized to administef the government.**
Only one case is recorded in which it became obvious to Congress that
a successful attempt had been made by Lincoln to change its action
through means not recognized by the Constitution, and it excited greal
indignation and plain-spoken condemnation in the Senate. Senator
Sherman declared tnat Congress was held in "duress"; Lane of Indiana
declared that "duress" to be the "threat of a veto from the President'
Preston Zing of Hew York thought that Congress was coerced, and
Senator Tade sneered at the practice of "learning the royal pleasure"
before they could pass a bill. Lincoln's extra-legal power over
Congress, although great, very distinctly had a limit. That limit
seemed to be reached when he allowed Congress to see clearly that he
was usin^ the prestige and political leverage of his office to get
his measures adopted, even when Congress originally intended other-
wise.***
*Rhodes, vol. IV, page 170. Later in that session Thaddeus Steven
thought of moving a vote of want of confidence in the administra-
tion, (Rhodes, voli IV, page 240.)
**And Joseph Medill wrote to A.S.Hill, "/.arch 20, 1863, "Let us first
get the ship out of the breakers; then court-martial the officers
if tney deserve it. "(Rhodes, vol. IV, page 241.)
***Con.-;ressional TLobe , Debate of July 16, 1362, pages 33-75 et, seq
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An executive order of February 11, 1862 reads as follows:
"Ordered, that D.C ,MoCallum be, and he is hereby appointed military
director and superintendant of railroads in -the United States, with,
authority to enter ui^on, take possession of, hold and use all (rail-
road property) that may be required for ( the military purposes) of
the United States, and do and perform all acts and things that may be
necessary or proper for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid."*
It is confined to the military uses of the railroads. This was by
the authority of the Act of Congress approved January 31, 1862, en-
titled "an act to authorize the President of the United States in
certain cases to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and
for other purposes.**
An executive order dated February 25, 1862, reads: "Ordered,
.that on and after February 26, instant, the President, by virtue of
the Act of Congress, takes military possession of all the telegraph
lines in the United States." The order proceeds, 2nd., to forbid
unauthorized military communications, 3d., to proclaim that newspapers
publishing unauthorized military news would thereafter be excluded
from telegraphic service, 4th., to constitute Edward S.Sandford
military "supervisor" of telegraph messages through the United States,
and Anson Stager military superintendant of telegraph lines and
cffices in the United States.
Besides these powers over domestic communications, Lincoln was
given and assumed certain others over external commerce, including
bommarce with the rebellious States. By the Act of July 13, 1861,
* Richardson, Volume VI, page 10.
** Richardson, Volume VI, page 116.

commercial intercourse with States that were by tne Tresident's
proclamation declared in rebellion, was' prohibited so long as hos-
tility continued, except as permitted by the President under rules
prescribed by the Secretrry of the Treasury* Lincoln understood
himself to be constituted the judge of the time when hostilities
ceased to continue, in the sense of this act, which was not unreason-
able, and Inarch 31, 186.r?,he issued a proclamation re-opening com-
merce with certain conqi; ored Southern States.*
But it required in his mind only the war-clauses of the Con-
stitution to authorize him on ITovember 21, 1362, to issue an execu-
tive order prohibiting the export of arms, ammunition or munitions
of war. Munitions of war included everything which in the judgment
of officials was useful for the conduct of the war.** This same
order directed the Secretary of 7ar to retain certain shipments of
munitions bound for Canada which he had already seized on his own
authority. There can be no doubt that this was an entirely necess-
ary war-meas-re. It coies much nearer than some of his other acts
to being covered by the passages of the Constitution which made him
custodian of the executive power and commander-in-chief of the army
and navy.
The Confiscation Act of July 12, 1862 was an act giving what
Congress regarded as special powers to the President. It authoriz-
ed the President to use the negroes as soldiers, gave him power to
amnesty rebels by proclamation and make exceptions from a general
pardon.*** Almost certainly there is not one of these powers that
*Hichardson, Volume VI, page 174.
**Richardson, Volume VI, page 178. Executive order of September
4, 1363, and volume VI, page 235, executive order of April 2,
1364.
***Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. IV, page 60 and 62.

the President would not have taken in case of need whether such an
act Congress existed or not. It suggests that Congress may per-
haps not have clearly understood the nature of authority under which
it was living. ?he Emancipation Proclamation did not simply con-
fiscate slaves of rebels who were subdued, but declared a policy of
emancipation. ?he colonization of freed negroes 7/as not strictly
a war-power, but if it had ever become necessary to the advancement
of the war it can hardly be doubted that Lincoln would have done it
in a moment by executive proclamation. ?he use of negroes as sol-
diers really did not need Congressional authorization. As for the
power of pardon, the Constitution specifically confers on the Presi-
dent the "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against
the United States, except in cases of impeachment."*
?he war-powers of President Lincoln have now been described.
General comment upon them will be reserved until the powers of Pres-
ident Wilson have been described, for purposes of comparison.
* Article 11, section 2.

CHAPTER THREE
WAR POWERS OF PRESIDENT WILSON
On April the second, nineteen hundred seventeen, President
"bodrow Tilson asked Congress to "take immediate steps not only
to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but al30
to exert all it3 powers.** On April the nineteenth, after more
than two weeks, the House Military Affairs Committee reported a
bill.** in less tnan half the time taken to report this measure,
Prussia in her war against Austria haa defeated her enemy at
Libenau, Turner, and Podeli. In two days less than that Sadcwa
"^3 fought, overthrowing Austria. Forty- five days after Presi-
dent Wilson's message was read, on the seventeenth of May, Con-
gress finished the army bill.***In the Franco- Prussian war only
that number of day 3 had elapsed when the battle of Sedan was
fought
,
On the basis of these facts it may be safely said that the
United States, which ha3 now become a member of the council of
nations, gave its executive a very insufficient war power in
April, 1917. If it Is urged that We can depend on the oceans
to protect us from sudden attacks like those which are delivered
Pres. Wilson's War Message, N.Y. Times Current History Magazine,
May, 1917.
Chicago Tribune, April SO.
Chicago Tribune, May 13.
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by modern European powers, it is enough to suggest the memory of
the U.53, the German submarine that appeared off our Atlantic
coast one fine day. And added to this fact of the long arm of
modern military powers is the attitude of Canada on the subject.
Canada also has the protection of the oceans, and there is on
her Statute boohs today a lav; -vhich requires the executive to do
and aut-.crize such acts and things as may be deemed "necessary
or advisable for the peace, order, security and -elfare of
Canada" - vhich means that the Canadian legislature gives the
Canadian executive in cne lump all the emergency authority that
it can possibly give him under the Canadian constitution act.*
For years the United States Congress has been exercising
great executive powers. And it seems clear that this is not to
the advantage of the nation, for a Congress of two houses and
four hundred individuals is not the proper body to exercise
executive authority. Obviously it is very hard to hold it re-
sponsible for executive act 3 and the success of its executive
policies. And what makes the situation still worse, when Congress
i3 exercising executive authority it is hard for the country to
hold the President responsible for executive acts - the two
branches can shift responsibility back and forth.
,ne of the worst phases of this confusion of function and
consequent waste is the habit that Congre33 acquired of including
instructions" to executive officers a3 riders in appropriation
oiil3. in 1909 Senator Aldrioh a3 chairman of the Finance Com-
mittee computed the waste of public money that results from this
* H. J. Ford, "VTar and the Constitution", in the Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 130, pp. 485-93.
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practice as $50, 030,000 per annum.*
Great executive
_
owers are exercised by Gongres sional
Committees. For example, the committee in charge of Havy Yards
determines where docks and naval "bases shall be located, and h@w
they Bhall be equipped. The result is suggested by the debate
in the House of February 15, 1909, in which this committee,
charged with failing to j rovide docks large enough for modern
battle-ships of the line, replied that the fault lay with Congress
which 3hould never have ordered such monsters'. The i o ver that
Congress exercises in federal appointments, a purely executive
function, is notorious. Such usurpation of executive authority
Oy a dilatory, politic3-af ili eted, deliberative assembly, has led
in certain historic cases, to Caesarism. Perhaps the most sur-
prising example of the way iv. :hi ch Con.v res s ir.s tended to become
both legislature and executive, is the case of "concurrent resolu-
tions". The Constitution provides that "every order, resolution,
or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Re-
presentatives may be necessary (except as to que3tion3of adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States"
for hia approval.** Yet? strange to say, concurrent resolutions
are not today submitted to the President for veto. Professor H.
J. Ford 3ays that "By this device Congress makes a large distri-
bution of gratuities, perquisites, and ofTice3 among members at
every session."***
It is obvious that a re-statement of the powers of the
* Ibid.
** Article 1, Section 3.
*** H. J. Ford, Ibid.

executive had become nece33ary by April, 1917.
There is nothing like a war to magnify trie executive.
The greater the emergency, the greater the powers he receives.
This is particularly likely to be true if the executive i3 a man
Of force, commanding the respect and confidence of Congress and
the country. Add to this a rare understanding of American his-
tory and government, and a 30 year advocacy of a change in the
relationships of executive and legislature,* and one begins to
understand how to account for Woodrow Wilson.
In three respects in particular, the war powers of Presi-
dent Wilson are unique. First and foremost, in his control over
industry and commerce. Second, in his control over Congress
(and to a lesser degree the public opinion of the country)
.
Third, in his freedom from Ccngressionally provided executive
machinery. These three will be described last, in this order.
Wilson's other powers are not precisely like anything that has
':een done by a President before, but they have greater similari-
ties to the war powers of other times, or are less important.
The first thing that brought home to the country the fact
that we were at war and extraordinary executive functions were
being exercised, r;as the selective draft. The act was approved
"Jay 18, 1318, and empowered the executive to conscript for mili-
tary service all able-bodied citizens and parsons of foreign
birth who had ta::en out their first naturalization papers, who
were between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, inclusive.**
* An Old Master, and Other Essays, by Woodrow Wilson, p. 45.
** Times Current History Magazine, July 17, Vol. Vi,
pt. II, No. 1, p . 14.

The registration-day vas June 5, 1917. From various }:art3 of the
country plots to oppose the draft were reported. "The Depart-
ment of Justice had a tremendous machinery ready to cope ..1th
t -3e conspiracies, but it was unnecessary." The severest penalty
for resistance was three years imprisonment passed on an anarchist
named Louis Kramer.* This i3 the only disturbance recorded and
•-3 a striking contrast to the sporadic outbursts on the day of
Civil ""ar draft registration, and the four-day riot in Hew York
on the day of the lottery. Many who declined to register have
"been sentenced to a year's imprisonment under the act - no one
knows just how many.
About nine and three quarters million registered under this
act. In May of 1S18 Congress voted that all young men who had
become twenty-one since June fifth 1917 should register for draft
on a date set by the President. General Crowder estimated that
a million men would register under this act. The President set
June 5, 1913 j as the date for the new registration by proclama-
tion.**
As commander of the army and navy President Wilson can
exercise even less direct control than did Lincoln. In the first
::Iace the fighting is three thousand miles away across the
Atlantic. In the 3econd place, the alii e 3 have agreed on one cen-
tral supreme commander for the Western front. And in the third
place, fighting Is infinitely more technical a matter than it was
even in Civil War days. Doubtless "'ilson had a great deal to
do with large decisions like sending Pershing over with an advance
* Statement by Committee on Public Information and Times
Current Hi story Magazine
,
July 17, ::age 14, evening of June fifth.
*"* Chicago T r i bune
,
May 20, 1918 ,

iorce, "but just .vhat this share may have been in the strictly
military councils of the nation it is impossible now to determine,
aside from the certainty that ne has decided the appointments of
men for the higher military and naval positions. That power he
could scarcely delegate.
A v reclamation of November 19, 1917, provides under
section 4067 of the revised statutes that by means of military
guards enemy aliens shall be prevented from aiproaching within
prescribed water-fronts, or within three mile3 of navigable
3 tr earns. They are expelled from the District of Columbia and the
Panama Canal Zone. They must be registered, mu3t obtain govern-
ment consent if they wish to change their occupations, and must
report from time to time to federal authorities and municipal
of fi cer s . *
The only thing in -resident ril son's policy bearing any
resemblance to the arbitrary arre3t3of Lincoln's time is the
treatment of enemy aliens laid down in this order for Germans and
in a later order for Austrians. The treatment is identical for
the citizens of the two countries. Section 12 of the order pro-
vides that "An alien enemy whom there may be reasonable cause to
believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at
large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who vio-
lates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable
ground to believe that he is about to violate, any regulation duly
promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United
States, or of the States or Territories thereof, will be subject
* Times Cur . Hist . Hag . Jan. 1S18, vol. VII, pt. 11,




to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or Lis deputy,
or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to
confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp,
or other place of detention as may be directed by the President."*
The Constitution of the United Statesprovides, "No person shall
be held to answei for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless cn a presentment cr indictment of a grand jury . . . nor
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."** I suppose that even enemy aliens are "persons"
,
The 3tatus of International law on the subject is 3et forth by
Coleman PhiHip son, in his "International Lav; and the Great War" :***
"Though there is no definitive international law on the subject,
may net be
it ha 3 become a modern customary rule that enemy aliens^arrested .
"
However, it is necessary to remember that many enemy aliens are
reservi sts in the armie3 of our enemies. The protections of the
Constitution do net extend to prisoners taken on the battle-field,
and these enemy aliens in this country, when reservists in the
armies of our foes, are in an analagous position. And whether or
not this order wa3 in accordance with the Constitution, it was
certainly in accordance with the powers conferred on the President
by act of Congre33. It is provided that "whenever there is de-
clared a war between the United States and any foreign nation or
government, ... and the President makes public proclamation of
the event, all natives, citizens, denizens cr subjects of the
hostile nation or government being males of the age of fourteen
* Am. Jour. Int. Law, Jan. 1918, vol. 12, No. 1, p. 161.




years or upnardi who shall be v.! thin the United States, and not
actually naturalised, shall be liable to be apprehended* re-
strained, secure!, and removed as alien enemies."*
The next clear division of President Wilson's powers is
hie authority over commerce and industry.
These functions had a beginning before the United States
entered the war, but were in anticipation of our entry into the
struggle. I omit mention of the United States War Risk Insurance
Bureau, which is not the soldiers and sailors insurance agency men-
tioned later, but a government- owned marine insurance company,
established in 1315 because the private companies were reaping
such harvests from the timidity of ship-owners during our neutral-
ity. It cut private rates in half and made a profit of
?4, 455,524 in three years.** The first step was the appointment
by the President on his own authority of the Committee on Indus-
trial Preparedness, which made a canvass oi the industrial re-
sources of the country under Howard E, Coffin and secured valuable
confidential data concerning 19, ©00 establishments.*** Then -
3ti^l before the country .vent to war - this committee was replaced
by the Council of National Defense, composed of the Secretaries of
~ar, i.avy, interior, Co.-erce and Agriculture, and an advisory
commission of 3even non-official citizens, presided over by [r.
Coffin and including great industrial magnates, chief among whom
Revised Statutes, sect. 4037.
Times Q .H.M
.
, J ly, 1917, vol. VI, pt. ii, No. 1, P« 35.
•For Fhis and following see Time
3
C.H.M. for November,
1917, vol. Vii, pt. i, No. 2, po. 233 et.seq.
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wae Daniel Willard, the railroad president. Unlet this body there
sprang up a complicated network of boards and coraini 3 3ions which
multiplied rapidly as soon as we declared war, a3 I know, for I
was in Washington in the .hmsey Building which housed the Council,
from the middle of April, 1917, to the middle of the following
August. At fir3t its most important subsidiary was the General
Munitions Board under Frank A. Scott, chairman. Then at the end
of July this wa3 replaced by the ^ar Industries Board, sti^I under
Scott, intended to act as the cuief permanent committee of the
Council of National Defense, having under it seven committees,
each over some great division of industry. This Board had the
•:c er to fix ^rices - not t: rough Congressional Act, but simply
because the President wa3 able to induce the businessmen of the
country to aecept Ida rulings. This was a striking example of the
::tra-leral power acquired by the chief executive in time of war.
He issued on July 11, 1917, a proolamation that ought to become
istoric. It began, "The Government is about to attempt to de-
termine the prices at which it -.111 a3k you henceforth to furnish
various supplies."* It is aot followed by a threat, but by an
appeal to the fairnes3 of the business of the country. One was
quite justified in wondering what the profiteering plutocrats
would do about it. The first great order under the proclamation
.-as i33ued by the tfar Industries Board on the authority of the
President on September 21, IS 17,** by w..ich the prices of the
different forms of 3teel and iron were cut one-half or more, on
the theory, pub.icly announced, that this still left the ircn-
Times C.ti.ll., AugU3t 1917, vol. "I, pt. li, No. 2, p. 2:7.
**See daTly papers of September 23.
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naster3 a fair profit. And the order was unhesitatingly accented,
so far as the public could see. According to an of.icial state-
ment the saving in various grades of iron and steel amounted to
from 40 to 70 percent.*
Under the War Industries Board v/a3 shortly organized the
Priority Board, headed by R. S. Lovett, irhlch placed the distri-
bution of iron and steel absolutely under control by license.
Perha/3 it is i ot entirely impossible to explain the docil-
ity of big bu3ines3 under President V'ilson's direction in thi3 and
many other matters. The great magnates must have realized that
the President had them pretty much in his power, duetto the fact
that if they had displayed any cut the mo3t thoroughly cooperative
9] irit the country would have been 30 disgusted that it would have
enthusiastically supported a proposition from the President that
the government take over these businesses and operate them for the
duration of the war. And if the government once proved that it
could handle such an enterprise for the benefit of the people,
these profiteers would have had their hands full getting their
businesses back again. There is great reason to believe that this
is the way the busine33 men sized up the situation, for this i3
exactly what happened to several great businesses, nitably the
railroad business and the grain broker business. President r'il3on
has not waved a big stick over the trusts very much, but there is
nothing more certain than that thjre :;a3 cne in his easy reach.
And he has 3truck once or twice with amazing effect.
* Time
3





The railroads started cut on the same plan of voluntary
cooperation. A group of railway chiefs under Daniel 77illard was
as joci \ted with the Council of National Defense, and it accom-
plished huge results. For example, the pooling of lake coal and
lake ore saved 53,000 cars per annum. And by a similar pooling of
tidewater coal a saving of 133,000 cars aras effected.* But even
:ult3 like these were not enough. The railway officials were
ready to go to a certain point "out '.-hen the plan for efficiency
in the whole system necessitated too deep a cut into the profits
of some company, the line was drawn. In the case of the road
a
President ""ilson already had authority to act under the law of
August 29, 1216, which provided that he could take possession of
the railroads, for military uses "and such other purposes connec-
ted with the emergency a3 may be needful or desirable." An exe-
cutive proclamation was i33ued December 26, 1317, under which the
Federal Government took full control. The road3 should have
known better than to stick at profits. The Secretary of the
Treasury, William Gibbs McAdoc, the President' 3 3on-in-law, was
Bp] cinted Director of the Pailroad3, and he issued his first order
December 29, pooling all terminals, ports, locomotives, rolling
stock and other transportation facilities, thereby making the rail-
roads a single great system. In a few days the market value of
railway stocks alone went up $350,000,000.**
Times C.K.U., February 1S13, vol. VII, pt.II, No. 3,
^- • .J C <5 •
**The facts of government control over the railways are
conveniently ^iven in a summary of Associated Pre3s dispatches in




Tne President wanted, a more specific Congressional grant of
I -
vers for this "nuge undertaking. The railroads of the country
are composed of 441 distinct corporations, their securities are
held by 630,000 individuals, they include 360,000 miles of lines,
represent an investment of seventeen and a half billion dollars,
and employ an army numbering 1,500,000.* In February, accordingly
Congress passed the Railway Control Bill, giving the executive a
free hand in the administration of the roads, providing they should
not remain in government hands under this act more than 21 months
after the end of the ;.ar, and guaranteeing the owners about
$945,000,000 per an^um.**
• Drastic orders have been issued as to the way in which the
road3 should be run, and millions of dollars have been saved
thereby. For a long time the personnel of the railroads was un-
disturbed. But on '.-'ay 21, 1918, Director UcAdoo issued an order
removing the presidents of all the railroads, preparatory to
placing Federal agents in their positions. To what extent the ye
Federal agents will be the old railway presidents has not yet
developed . ***
On April 28, 1917, President T.'ilson issued an order con-
cerning the telegraph, telephone and cable communications of the
United States reading in part as follows: "Therefore, by virtue
of the power vested in me under the Constitution and by the
Joint Resolution pa33ed by Congress on April 5, 1917, declaring




Chicago Tribune , May 22.
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or other persons, owning, controlling, or operating telegraph
and telephone line3 or submarine cables, are hereby prohibited
from transmitting messages from points within the United States,
and from delivering messages received at such joints', except
those permitted under rules and regulations to be established by
the Secretary of Far for telegraph and telephone lines, and by the
Secretary of the l"„vy for submarine cables." A similar order
taking possession of radio stations was issued 30 as to be prac-
tically effective on April 6, the d„y ox the declaration of war,
but it was amended to be more stringent and to specify the addi-
tional authority of the Act to Regulate Radio Communication, ap-
proved August 3, 1913, on the last day of April.*
The Lever Food and Fuel Control Bill passed Congress
August 10, 1917, after a bitter debate. The President's statement
of "ay 19, 1917, asking for this legislation reads, in part, as
follows: "The objects sought to be served by the legislation a3ked
for are: Full enquiry into the existing available stocks of food-
stuffs and into the costs and practices of the various food-
l roducing and distributing trades; the prevention of all unwarran-
ted hoarding of every kind, and of the control of food--: tuffs by
persons who are net in any legitimate sense producers, dealers, or
traders; the requisitioning When nece3::ary for the .ublic use of
fcod- supp lies and of the equipment necessary for handling them
properly; the licensing of wholesome and legitimate mixtures and
milling percentages; and the prevention of the unnecessary or
wasteful U3e of food3.
For these orders see the Supplement of the American Jour-
nal of International Law, January 1918, vol. 13, No. 1, pp . 12 & 35
.

"Authority is asked also the establish prices."*
The legislation asked for was forthcoming. Immediately on
his appointment as Food Administrator, Mr. Herbert E. Hoover
issued a statement of purposes, part of which follows: "The hopes
of the food administration are three-fold. First, to 30 guide the
trade in the fundamental food commodities as to eliminate vicious
speculation, extortion, and wasteful practices, and to stabilize
prices in the essential industries. Second, to guard our exports.
...
** And third, that we stimulate in every manner within our
power the saving of our food.***
The signing of the Food Control Act had a salutary effect,
before Mr. Hoover had raised a finger. Cash corn fell off 35 and
27 cents a bushel in Chicago, and 30 to 32 cent 3 in St. Louis.
The last Chicago quotation for one day showed a loss of 50 cents
in three days. In three days wheat declined 4- cents a bu3hel.
Potatoes sold "2.00 down from the former high price. Poultry
dropped 2 to 3 cent3 a , ound, e^gs 2 cent3 and butter one cent.***
The v:ry fact that the government had these powers evidently made
it unnecessary to use them to the iirr.it. The price of wheat was
fixed by executive proclamation, Mr. Hoover at his own request not
taking any 3hare in that decision. And it was B„n;.ounced that
Mr. Hoover, "as a preliminary 3tep " intended to t-.ke over control
Times C.H. ..
,
Sept., 1917, vol. VI, pt. II, ko. 1, p.
38S, et 3eq.
**A power which, although placed partly in the food adminis-
tration by the President, was not vested by the Lever Bill, but by
the Embargo Act, described later.
***fbid
.
****I"r;id., November 1917, vol. VII, pt.I, No. 2, p. 236.

of all grain elevators and all mills with a daily capacity of over
100 bbls. of flour and place them under a system of licenses that
would make Lear ding impossible. At the same time the Grain Ex-
changes were requested - ;.ow grimly they must have smiled at that
word "re quested"'. - to suspend all dealings in futures. They saw
fit to comply, A -"SO, :00,CC<0 cor. oration was formed under the
Food Administration, known as the United States Grain Corporation,
which went into the grain brokerage business at the terminals and
proceeded to buy up the whole 1917 wheat crop! It made not a
dollar of profit; it served as the "middle-man", so that every
bushel of wheat in the country passed through the hands of the
lovernment from the elevators and terminals to the mills. The
millers were allowed a profit of 25 cents a barrel.*
A provision in the food bill prohibiting the manufacture or
import of distilled liquors became effective September 8, 1917.
The estimated saving of food grain was 40,000,000 bushels a year.
The power to suppress this trade and manufacture was granted as a
war measure
.
A proclamation of September 15, 1917, placed the sugar
industry entirely under ~overnment control through a system of
licenses, and in October the price of beet sugar at refining cen-
ters wa3 fixed at '7.35 per cwt.**
The bulk of the food business of the country was brought
under the absolute control of .'r. Hoover on October 10, 1917, by





subjeoted all dealers in essential foodstuffs to a strict licens-
ing system, to go into effect November 1, 1917. Thereafter the
government dictated the manufacture, storage, importation, and
distribution of food, under the penalties of the Food Control Act.*
Two ether proclamations clinched the power of Hoover, one
issued November 3, 1917, prohibiting all direct trade in flour
between America and Europe, and another, November 13, 1917, exten-
ding the licensing system to the bakeries which, like the railroads
had not been wise enough to carry out voluntary cooperation when
it meant contenting themselves with only a reasonable profit.**
The United States Grain Corporation does not represent the
whole of the food-trading activities of the Food Administration.
It immediately engaged in the trade in other commodities and when
it observed any attempt to manipulate exchange for the purpose of
inflating prices, it immediately entered the lists as the champion
of the ultimate consumer. For example, to smash one great sugar
conspiracy, Hoover arranged to take over 200,000,000 lbs. of raw
Louisiana 3ugar, the "-hole transaction involving about "13,000,000.
Besides such activities as these the Food Administration
engaged in a country-wide campaign of publicity, and before Novem-
ber, one family out of three in the United States was pledged to
observe the rules of the administration.
It was very easy to see the results of these measures. The
country .vould have been satisfied if food prices had not continued
*Pew York Time_3, October 11.
This, and the activities of the Food and Fuel Administra-
tions described below are summarized in the New York Times C.H.M.
for January, 1918, vol. VII, pt. II, No. 1, p. 433 et 3eq.
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to soar out of sight, and ultimately that may be all that the
most efficient administration can accomplish. For the food
emergency is acute and world-wide. The Allied crop was
500 «000 9000 bushels short of normal in 1917. Mr. Hoover said:
"".'nereas we exported before the war out 80,000,000 bushels of
wheat per annum, thi3 year, by one means or another, we must find
for them 835,000,000 bushels and this in the face of a short
crop."* This was only the wheat problem. But in spite of these
i r.se difficulties, the previous hysterical rise in food prices
••.as not only checked, but in December 1917 the prices of food
actually showed a decline. The Food Administration was a success.
In the same Act which established Food Control, a Fuel
Administration was authorized with similar sweeping powers. Here
the experiment of voluntary cooperation under Dr. Garfield,
formerly President of Williams College, seems to have been con-
tinued too long. A period of extremely severe weather, precipi-
tated a cri3i3 and again the hand of iron came plainly into view.
_e:in:.ing January 13, Garfield ordered that every factory east of
the Mississi.pi Pdver, except food-producing establishments,
should snut down for five days, and on nine successive "londays
immediately following. The order was backed by President v iison'3
published approval, but it naturally raised a storm. Storming
did not the least good, however, and in fact the great majority
of people seemed to realize the neced3ity for following the lead
of the A.-ministration even in extreme measures like these. So




relieved. There was enough coal in the country, out the fuel
problem is partly a problem of distribution, and it was here that
the trouble seemed to be. The success of the measure made it
unnecessary to continue the plan for nine heatless Mondays after
two had passed .
*
The next great and striking extension of executive author-
ity over ousine8S for war purposes, is the government control of
Shipping. It is not only a power of control, but of construction,
purchase j and confiscation.
It became evident before we entered the war that the
success of the allies was more imperilled by the sucmarine menace
to ocean communication tnan by any other 3ingle physical factor.
The problem of making the most of available snipping and in-
creasing the supply, was one of first importance when we declared
war. TTc could make armies and supplies faster than the ships
then in the water could carry them over - very much faster. And
all the time the submarines kept pegging away. On April 16, 1817,
President Wilson secured legislation establishing a Shipping
Board,- with power to administer all snipping, and generally over-
see and direct the merchant marine situation. The law authorized
under the Board, a Building Corporation, subsequently organized
aa the Emergency Fleet Corporation, with a capital of 50, 000, 000
- all, of course, under the ultimate control of the President.
Important features of the program were delayed almost exactly six
months by a squabble between the Board and the Corporation over




was ended by the head of the Fleet Corporation resigning and by-
President Wilson's calling for the resignation of the heal of the
Board. On October 15, 1917, the Board issued an order taking over
all steamer 3 of over 3,500 tons that were at that moment subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. This did net include
many ships of American registry, for the United States at that
time had practically no merchant marine. B^t it got between 700
and 80 j vessels that were in our ports and building on our ways,
most of which belonged to Great Britain, Norway and Holland - a
tonnage of about two million.*
Already the tJnited States had taken over many of the German
and Austrian ships in our p crts** - the latter being requisitioned
* * *
and paid for, 3ince 7/3 .vere not at that time at war with Austria.
In early June the Havy took fourteen more German ships; it took
15 more on July 37, and we had got the Austrian vessels, 14 of
them in June. On October 17, the President, by executive order,
took 87 additional German vessels, all that remained in the ports
of the United States. On April the sixth the United State3 had
practically no merchant tonnage. By October the seventeenth she
had commandeered from her own cit.zens, from her allies, her ene-
mies and neutrals, a government owned merchant fleet of almost
3*000 j 000 tons 1
* Hew York Times , October 13.
** On April 6, 1917, the Navy took about 100 German ships
in cur ports, amounting to approximately 600,000 tens and worth
100 , 3 30 , 000 .
*** A joint resolution, approved May 17, 1917, authorized the
President to take over th vessels Of nations with which the Uni-




This was 3urely a good beginning. On November 13, 1917,
the Shipping Board announced an agreement by which the United
States took over 400,000 tons of skipping owned by northern
European neutrals and Japan.* And on August 34, 1917, the
Shipping Board submitted estimates calling for the construction
of 1,270 ships, of 7,968,000 tons burden, bringing the appropria-
tion for building, commandeering and purchase, up to
£3,000,000,000. The money was voted and contracts for three
great government owned ship-building yards were let August 31 by
the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The scale on which these enter-
_ rises were undertaken is obviously very great. For illustration,
after the first 3hip is turned out from one of these yards it can
produoe a 5000- ton steel vessel every two working days. A single
contract to private builders called for fifty ships of 7500 tons
each, car. able of developing 11 knots speed, and worth ol, 100, 000
apiece; also, 70 ships of 8000 ton3 burden each, capable of 16
knots, (passenger steamers on the Lakes are sometimes satisfied
with 13 and 13) and each worth .-1,600,000.
On September 6 the Snipping Board announced the establish-
ment of the American Chartering Commission, to have absolute power
over all charters of American ships or by American shippers. 3y
this means it can say what things shall be shipped, in what ves-
sels, and v.-here they shall go.**
Such are the powers exercised by President VJixSon over the
shipping situation, both directly through his own executive order
and proclamation, and indirectly through boards and corporations
* The Official Bulletin , Nov. 13, 1917.
** Ibid., Sept. 6.

-41-
rhich he can establish, modify, abolish, and direct.
The next great commercial power put into the hands of the
executive, i3 the entire control of foreign commerce. The Trading
viththe Enemy Act, approved October 5, 1317, read3 in section 11:
Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the
public 3a ety 30 requires and shall make proclamation thereof it
shall be unlawful to import into the United States from any
country named in such proclamation any article or articles men-
tioned in 3uch proclamation except at such time or times, and under
such regulations or orders and subject to such limitations or ex-
ceptions a3 the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered
by the President or by Congress." Section 5, paragraph (b) of
the same act provides that "the President may investigate, regu-
late, or prohibit under such rules and regulations a3 he may pre-
scribe, any transactions in foreign exchange, ex-port or ear-
markings of pold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers
of credit in any form, (other than credits relating solely to
transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and
transfers of the evidences of indebtedness or of the ownersni]
of property between the United States and any foreign country."
And section 3, paragraph (e) gives him the power to suspend any
part of the act by proclamations "Ho person shall be held liable
.n any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in
pursuance of any order, rule, or regulation made by the President
under the authority of this Act."*
Public. Jo. 31, 55th Congress, in Am. Journal of Inter-
nati onal Law
,
Supplement, January 1918, vol. XII, Ho. 1, pp.
27 et seq.

In accordance with the great powers vested by this
Statute, President Wilson on October 13, 1917, is3iied an execu-
tive order .vhich is probably one of the longest that wa3 ever
issued from the White House. The first two sections read:
"I hereby establish a War Trade Board to be composed of
representatives, respectively, of the Secretary of State, of the
Secretary of the Treasury, of the Secretary of Agriculture, of
the Secretary of Co-.merce, of the Food Administrator, and of the
United States Shipping Board.
"I herecy vest in said Board the power and authority to
issue licenses ... or to withhold or refuse licenses, for the
exportation of al^ articles, except coin, bullion, or currency."
In subsequent paragraphs this Board is given pov/er to make
exceptions to orders of the President declaring embargoes on
certain articles, to i 3sue licenses to trade with the enemy, to
make the rules and regulations for its own proceedings. A War
Trade Council, composed of the same individuals whose representa-
tives make up the i?ar Trade Board, is established to act in an
advisory capacity to tne latter body. The Secretary of the
Treasury is given the administration of the executive pov/ers men-
tioned in the act and quoted above in regulating the movement of
coin and bullion and oth^r foreign exchange.* Nothing can
1 . ive the United States without the executive's permission.**
financial control i3 very cl0 3ely related to, and indeed
is in these days almost necessary to, complete industrial and
*An Alien Property Custodian i3 provided for.
**Am. Journal of international Lav:, Supplement, January,
1918, vol. XI 1, no. 1, pp. 51 et seq.
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jomaeroial control. The great businesses vhich the government
i3 carrying found themselves hammered by a 3tringency in the
money market. The first Tar Congress voted to spend over eighteen
billion dollars, and the government immediately began to float
immense loans. This pretty 'veil used up the available crei.it of
the country. Private business was embarrassed. The 1,Tar Finance
Commission wa3 created by Act of Congress cn April 5, ISIS, to
grease the wheels of the financial machine where they ground too
hard. Its structure was a3 follows. Five directors, including
the Secretary of the Treasury, .rere to be appointed by the Presi-
dent. There was to be a 30-called Capital Issues Committee of
seven members, three of them from the Federal Reserve Board - all
chosen by the President With the consent of the Senate. The
President can remove any member, without the consent of the
Senate, and he appoints the first chairman. The corporation is
to have a life of ten years, but can perform no function save
liquidation six months after the war. It is to have a capital
3tock of "500,000,000, held by the unite:! States Government and
it san i3sue three billion dollars worth of bonds. Nov; as to its
powers. It can make advances of not more than lc years duration
to any bank or trust company which has loaned money to an estab-
lished ousiness, up to 7o percent of the original loan, provided,
that the Ca- ital Is3ues Committee regards that business as essen-
tial to the conduct of the war.* The loan is secured to the War
Kailroad securities tfere exempted by Congre33 from the
review of the Capital Issues Committee, on the theory, evidently,
that all loans to railroad companies promoted the war. This may
be questioned. It would be an interesting study to follow the
trail of the railroads over the page 3 of the Congressional Record




Finance Corporation by the original collateral taken by the
banker ani by the banker's endorsement. In the next place, the
Cor$ oration can make loans to savings banks, com...ercial banks
and oui^ding and loan a : . ociations
,
provided, that the loan does
not run over one year and is secured by 133 percent collateral,
and provided further, that the transaction is approved by the
Capital Issues Committee a3 promoting the industrial processes
essential to the war. In the third place, the Corporation can
make direct loans for a period of not over five years to any pri-
vate borrower who ha3 not been able to obtain funds on reasonable
trrms through the ordinary channels. In this case the approval
of the Capital Issues Committee is again required, to insure the
necessity of the transaction to the prosecution of the ?;ar, and
135 percent coliaterial is demanded. Finally, this commission is
authorized to deal in any class of United States Bonds i33ued
subsequently to September 39, 1217. The object of this provision
is to allow it to guide trade in these securities with a view to
stabilizing their value. The purpose of this legislation i3 to
keep the financial machinery of the country running smoothly and
3teadily. The power of the administration over foreign exchange
contributes to it3 control over domestic finance.*
The war powers exercised by President Wilson over the
industry, oommeroe, and finance of the nation have now been de-
scribed. The next grand division of his war powers is the author-
ity which he exercises over the opinion of the country, : riuarily
The best current summary of this legislation that I have
,.5n able to find is in the Review of Revi ews, May 1318, vol.
Lvii, No. 15, pp. 467 et seq.
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in Congress, lit also in the pres3 and even in the iatly conversa-
tion of the people.
First j as to President Wilson's control over Congress.
"He appears at the Capitol and addresses Congress in his own
person. He visits the President's room in the Senate wing and
meets law-makers on public business. He formulates administra-
tion policies, involving legislation, and gives them something
of the effect of Government Bills in Parliament."* These are
power a the assumption of which the necess/.ry leadership by the
sxecutive in time of war ha3 made easy.
One of the first things that President Wilson did after
the declaration of war, was to issue an executive order on April
14, 1917, reading as follows: "I hereby create a committee on
Puclic Information, to ce composed of the Secretary of Stat©,
the Secretary of r'ar, and the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian
who shall be charged with the executive direction of the com-
mittee."** This committee has issued such official new3 as it
thinks the people ought to have, and takes pain3 to prssent the
lacts and essential considerations upon which the administration
reaches important decisions. The newspapers took frequent occa-
sions to attack the Bureau at first, but later this opposition
waned. The Review of Reviews 3aid in the "vlay i3sue for 191S,***
"7'hen the Bureau was established there was fear lest it might
asdume an attitude restrictive of the proper freedom of the prose.
* Kevi ew of Reviews
,
lay, 1518, vol. LVII, i!o . 5, p. 430.
**Any copy of the "Official Bulletin" issued daily by
the committee.
Review of Reviews, vol. LVII, no. 5, p. 455.
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It has proved, on the contrary, to be a supporter of the rights
of the press, and it has acne much to promote a policy of publi ci-
ty iv3 arainst one of undue official 3ecretivene3s .
"
There are three acts of Congress which give the adminis-
tration 5xtraor,;.inary powers over the press, the mails, and con-
versation. The first is the Espionage Act, approved June 15,
1917, which provides tnat "when the United States i3 at war, who-
ever 3hall willfully make or convey false reports or false state-
ments with intent to interfere with the operation or success of
it3 military or naval forces, or to promote the success of its
enemies, and whoever, at such a time, shall willfully cau3e or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal
of duty in such forces, or shall willfully obstruct the recruit-
ing or enlistment service, to the injury thereof or of the United
States, shall be subjected to punishment."* Criticism of the
administration of a kind to hamper it in the conduct of the war
i3 made very difficult by this act. The second legal provision
covering such matters is in the Trading with the Enemy Act.**
* * *
The act reads, "Whenever during the present war, the President
shall deem that the public safety demands it, he may cause to be
censored unler such rules and regulations as he may from time to
time establish, communications by mail, cable, radio or other
means of transmission parsing between the United States and any
foreign country that he may from time to time specify, or which
American Journal of International Law , vol. XII, No. 1,
p. S3.
** tub section (dj of section 3.
***Am. Journa l of international Lav;
,
Supplement, vol. XII,
..o. 1, January, 1918, page 39.
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may be carried by any vessel or other means of transportation
touching1 at any I'.ort, x. lace, or territory of the U.dted States
and ocund to or from any foreign country." "Jnaer this act the
executive oiv.er of October 12, 1S17, established in sections
fourteen and fifteen a censorship board, as follows:* "I h.reoy
establish a Censorship Board to be com-_ osed of representatives,
respectively, of the Secretary of Tar, the Secretary of the I^avy,
the Postmaster General, the rar Trade Board, and the Chairman of
the Committee on Public Information. And I hereby vest in said
Censorship Board the executive administration of the rules, regu-
lations and proclamations from time to time establish by the
President, ... for the censorship of communications . " A state-
ment issued by the Postmaster General is as follows: "!7e snail
take great care net to let criticism which is personally or
politically offensive to the Administration affect our action."
But "a person may not say that the Government i3 controlled by
"i.1.1 Street or munition manufacturers or any other social inter-
est. . . . ^e '.rill not permit the publication or circulation of
anything hampering the war's prosecution or attacking improperly
our alii : 3 . "**
The third and last of the3e measures ha3 ju3t been passed,
and is called the second Espionage Act. The act was passed
Jlay 7, 1^18. It provides that the Postmaster-General, if in his
opinion the veli'are of the country r: qui re 3 it, may return any
mail to the sender.*** Concerning it the ;"ew re. u:^ic of "ay 18,
Am. Journal of International Law
,
Sup] lement, vol. XII,
no. 1, January 1918, page 54-55.
Times C.H.'f., iiov. 1917, p. 234.The nati on, May, 1918, vol .cvi ,;io .2759, p. 583.
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1916, publishes the following editorial comments: "The bill has
established a censorship of opinion in this country a3 drastic
as any censorship oas .veil be. Its p rovisions are vague and com-
irehensive, and bestow on the government during the war the power
to suitress practically any criticism which an administrative
official can plausibly consider harmful to the American cause or
likely to bring American institutions into disrepute." Those
provisions, in the opinion of the editor, "embody every principle
in respect to the coercion of opinion ?;hich the Constitutional
safeguard was supposed finally to have excluded from American law.
An editorial in the Independent (the espionage act 7/as
passed '..lay 7) after describing certain censorship methods under
the earlier acts, contains the following rather 3trong language:
"Such are the methods by which the Washington Bureaucracy retains
the helm. ... Emperor Wcodrow Wilson keeps his hold on the irmy,
the spy service and the Federal Courts."* The sane and conserva-
tive nation in lta is^ue for May 18 says: "Thirty-nine hundred
convictions obtained by the Department of Justice under existing
laws against disloyalty are a commentary upon the need for a new
Sedition Bill. ... '. rhat i3 certain is that it put3 arbitrary power
into the hands of the Postmaster-General to render incommuni cado
"any person or concern" by refusing to deliver addressed mail upon
^evidence satisf ctory" to the Postmaster-General . ... It is for
the President to decide whether we stand in need of arbitrary
measures such as neither England nor France has found it necessary
to adopt. "**
*The Independent , May 11, 1918, vol.IXIV, p. 239.
**The i.ation, Hay, 1918, vol. CVI, No. 3759, p. 583.

Besides these legally endorsed rowers, the President has
an immense prestige as our leader in war, ana this gives him
certain extra-legal war powers which he understands perfectly how
to U3e on occasion. Probably the mo3t striking example of his
exercise of such power is the price-fixing by executive •-.•reclama-
tion, already described. But it is not only the capitalists who
have felt his hand. The price oi labor has been in a measure
fixed in the shipping industry by the prestige of the President'
3
office. For a time the -:orkers in these trades were inclined to
be obstreperous and strikes were common. On February 17, 1918,
the President addressed the_ following telegram to William L.
Hvtcheson, -'ho was leading a strike in the shipyards as General
President of the Carpenters' and Joiners' Union of America. The
telegram read in part: "All the other Unions engaged in this
indi 3p ensible vork have agreed to abide by the decisions of the
Ship-building Wage Adjustment Board. ... Fill you co-operate, or
vail ycu obstruct?"* The strike immediately collapsed.
It has been clearly evident in all the foregoing that
President Wilson has been to a remarkable degree made free from
the supervision of Congress in the discharge of his executive
functions. This may end with the war; certainly it has been granted
as a distinctly war power. But the results of a long conflict
seldom pa3s entirely away, and if this executive freedom can be
made to continue it 111 mark a new and desirable departure in
American government. The one act which above all others relieves






la the Overman Act. Until this act was passed the organization
of the executive machinery - the "bureaus and departments and
commissions that carried on the work of the executive branch -
had been arranged and prescribed by Congress. That body thereby
not only told the President what to do, but -.vent into great detail
as to how he should do it. The Overman Bill end 3 that for the
period of the war at least. The act was approved May 20, 1318.
Under its provisions "Broad powers to reorganize and consolidate
executive departments and other executive agencies" are given.
The President is required to organize a special department to
carry on the air- craft business, which he did by executive order
on the day he signed the bill.*
This concludes the account of the extraordinary powers
irhich in the course of cne year and one month have been delegated
to President Til3on for the more efficient conduct of the war.




The following is a summary of the outstanding similarities and
contrasts between the w r powers of President Lincoln and .resident
ffilBon,
First of all, President Y.'ilson has abided much more closely
by the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Historians do not
question much that Lincoln, urged on by a desperate situation, dis-
regarded the Constitution, as I have indicated. It may be urged in
his defense, as he himself pointed out, that an insurrection within
the United States itself, with the bonds of order and government dis-
solving around him, justified extraordinary measures. Nevertheless,
he who would plead expediency for violating the Constitution has need
to show an overwhelming case. And it is reasonably clear that in
the case of arbitrary arrests, at least , Lincoln' s acts did his cause
no perceptible good.
On the other hand, the Uilson administration will someday have
to justify some of its acts at the bar of history. One should note
that the executive has in all doubtful cases first obtained the auth-
ority of an act of Congress to go upon. Unlike Lincoln, arbitrary
and perhaps unconstitutional acts are always "by the authority vested
in me by the act of Congress." But it cannot so escape responsibi-
lity. It performed the acts, and, for the .ost .part , It recommended
the laws by which they were permitted. There have been no arbitrary
arrests. But the interference with the freedom of speech, which
has been described, will have to stand review someday in the light of
the first article of the Amendments to the Constitution, which reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
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or abridging the freedom of speeoh or of the press." The first item
of American freedom is untrammelled religion. The second is free
speech and a free press. One of the questions upon which this paper
hoped to throw light was the capacity of democracy to develop effi-
ciency, as revealed by its conduct in time of war. Tt Is necessary
to conclude that in order to obtain warlike efficiency, democracy
in the past has ceased to be democracy during periods of war. The
temptation to secure the efficiency of absolutism by the methods of
absolutism ha3 in certain cases been too strong. It is extremely
important, however, that in the case of Lincoln, upon which time has
had opportunity to pass a matured judgment, it does not appear that
the clearly undemocratic methods really increased efficiency. The
suppression of free-speech in particular seems to hsve raised up much
more opposition than it quelled. Democracy is entirely consistent
with great concentrations of power power that is made free from
really hampering restraints. It is not consistent with arbitrary
c ot7 er • The people must be left free to speak. And in the past,
attempts to graft the methods of absolutism upon democratic stock
have not increased efficiency.
One of the most interesting contrasts between the powers of
the two war-Eresidents is in the huge increase of President ^'ilson's
power over business and industry. There has been a steady increase
of government interference in business since Lincoln's time represent-
ed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Uewlands Arbitration Act of 1913,
A modern war is largely a problem in social organization. The fact
that we have passed through a war is going to call our attention
sharply to the resources of social organization. Stern necessity is
compelling us to free our minds from many oil prejudices and timidi-
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ties, and adopt the most efficient social mechanisms and devices that
social or political scientists can surest. They are efficient,
that is to say, from the point of view of the general public. In
a certain sense, society has always been efficiently organized. The
Steel 'Crust was efficient. The railroads were efficient, very much
more efficient than they are today,- in working out the profit of
their owners. The efficiency of social organization in this country
has been too much for the benefit of the organizers. The war is
forcing upon us a grand overhauling of our whole economic system, to
organize it for the benefit of the nation as a whole. If the war
can commit the United States to that program, it will not only have
made the world safe for democracy but it will have imade democracy
efficient at home. This is one of the most significant possibilities
of President Wilson's greatly increased powers over business, indust-
ry and commerce.
A third interesting difference between the two Presidents is
in their relations to Congress. Congress would not, to any very
great extent, ^ollow Lincoln. It would vote him war powers v/hen in
its own .judgment they were necessary, but when the executive tried
to steer legislative policy theue was great resentment, even among
the members of his own party as has been shown. This was partly
due to a thorough distrust of the members of Lincoln's cabinet. But
Congress has been ready to follow the suggestions of President V.'ilson
to a surprising extent. ^or one thing, the organization of the
Democratic party is closer and of longer standing than was the organi-
zation of the Republican party in 1861, which makes the modern Demo-
cratic majority easier to discipline. ?or another, the people and
Congress are used to a broad construction of the Constitution, as
they were not in Lincoln's time. Furthermore, the precedents set by
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Lincoln made it easier for Congress and the country to see that
Treat powers are properly -riven to the executive in time of war.
Finally, since the tine of Lincoln, the people have had an increasing
tendency to hold the executive responsible for the general policies
of the government begun by his bold assumption of leadership in the
crises o " the Civil V7ar.
I
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